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A February 26, 1998 Wall Street Journal article
about the Portuguese territory of Macau, which was
published at the height of the city’s era of gangland
violence which came to be known as the Casino Wars,
vividly described the tiny colony as “perhaps the most
lawless six square miles on earth” (Morrison, 2008). The

three-year wave of violent crime which riveted regional
attention involved members of local Chinese triads, or
criminal brotherhoods, who fought one another, and
even targeted government leaders and gaming industry
officials, on Macau’s streets and inside the city’s casinos.
The Wall Street Journal’s intrepid correspondent
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recounted Macau’s “decadent atmosphere”, which she
claimed was “redolent of ‘Casablanca’”; and explained
that the city’s “major industries, legalized gambling
and prostitution, spawn other pursuits such as money
laundering, extortion, drugs, and violence” which
had granted Macau its seemingly ungovernable status
(Morrison, 2008).
The article appeared just one and a half years before
Portugal’s scheduled return of Macau to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in December 1999, and the
description of the disorder created by Macau’s “rival
crime syndicates battling for control of the rackets”
raised questions about the consequences of the pending
handover of sovereignty for the city’s basic law and
order. A subsequent article entitled “Mayhem in Macau”
which was published in the same newspaper several
months later suggested:

its remarkable contemporary economic ascendance
as exemplary of Macau’s sui generis regime of “casino
capitalism,” a particular mode of governance and
development which was enabled by the city’s return to
the PRC. The transformation of Macau into a global
gaming hub is intimately and intricately related to the
ongoing transformation of China into what is perhaps
the world’s most dynamic market economy, and today
Macau plays a fundamental role in the country’s
economic order.
Macau is often called “Asia’s Las Vegas”, and we will see
that the city’s recent gaming explosion has indeed been
driven, at least in part, by the local industry participation
of Las Vegas entrepreneurs such as Sheldon Adelson
and Steve Wynn. But to understand the recent global
ascendancy of Macau’s gaming business we must look
beyond the city’s contemporary North American casino
counterpart, and instead peer back half a millennia to
contemplate Macau’s formative origins as a European
colonial outpost at the outset of the modern era.
A key condition of Macau’s transformation is
the city’s unique form of sovereignty, an ambiguous
characteristic which has long served as Macau’s greatest
asset. To illustrate this condition I will briefly explore
three interrelated topics. First, I will discuss Macau’s
unique sovereign status as it has developed over the
past half a millennia. Second, I will recount the events
of the Casino Wars which unfolded in the final years of
Portuguese rule, and which called attention to Macau’s
unconventional sovereign status. Finally, I will reflect on
how the violent disruption of the Casino Wars enabled
the PRC, in the contemporaneous post-colonial and
post-socialist periods, to indirectly cooperate with
transnational gaming figures such as Adelson and
Wynn to exploit Macau’s peculiar sovereignty for the
purposes of economic development. These efforts
served to transform the city into a sort of experimental
laboratory where China would test macro-economic
policies central to the country’s market reforms. In a
literal process of “casino capitalism” Macau’s resorts
today function not only to employ locals and enrich
casino owners, but to comport a post-socialist Chinese
tourist subject who is crucial to the PRC’s market
economy. So let me turn now to the history of Macau’s
sovereignty “problem”, and its manifestation in the era
of the Casino Wars.

The mayhem is so bad that unlike people in nearby Hong Kong, who reluctantly returned to Chinese
sovereignty last July, many Macau residents can’t wait
for the mainland to take over. They want someone to
clean up the lawlessness. But China has promised to
maintain Macau’s way of life, just as it did with Hong
Kong, and there are no specific plans for curbing the
gangsters. (Brady, 2008)

However, despite such grave concerns about triad
influence and Macau’s future prospects under Chinese
rule, only two decades later the International Monetary
Fund declared in its 2018 Economic Outlook Update
that the now semi-autonomous Chinese “Special
Administrative Region” (SAR) of Macau was the world’s
second wealthiest territory as measured by per capita
GDP. The IMF confidently predicted that by 2020 Macau
would overtake Qatar to become the richest place on
earth (Fraser, 2018).
Macau’s unlikely and meteoric rise from seedy
colonial backwater to global economic powerhouse has
been driven entirely by the phenomenal growth of the
city’s casino gaming business, the industry which had
been earlier identified as the cause of the rampant and
uncontrollable triad mayhem. Interestingly, the triads
still play an important role in the industry today (Lo and
Kwok, 2016); and Macau’s spectacular gaming growth
has been in part enabled by the city-state’s ambiguous
sovereignty, the very quality which many observers had
decried as fomenting the anarchic days of the Casino
Wars.
In this paper I will characterize the enigmatic Macau’s Protean Sovereignty
equation which articulates Macau’s colonial-era
Portuguese explorers founded Macau in 1557 to
violence, the city’s endemic opaque sovereignty, and
facilitate Catholic missions into China and trade with
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the Middle Kingdom, and Macau played a crucial role in
the emergence of the global capitalist system in the 15th
and 16th centuries. As a port community in Portugal’s
formidable and far-reaching global empire, Macau was
unique among Portuguese settlements for two reasons.
First, in such strategic sites of trade as Calicut, Goa, and
Malacca, the Portuguese tended to take over, occupy,
and exploit already existing ports. But Macau was the
only Asian city which the Portuguese essentially created
in a foreign land (Gipouloux, 2011: 118). Although at
first it was merely a small settlement, in 1586 the viceroy
of Portuguese India granted Macau the formal status of
a city. The bestowal of city status on the territory had
the benefit of granting Macau’s European residents a
relatively high amount of autonomy in self-governance
in regards to their relations to the Crown (Clayton, 2009:
42), and also uniquely positioned them in relation to
Chinese officials. Macau’s nascent economy benefitted
from the city’s role as a medium of interchange between
Europe and the Ming dynasty, as well as trade between
China and Japan, which was forbidden by imperial
edict. For a century Macau was a crucial trading site
on the maritime routes which linked Antwerp, Lisbon,
Goa, Malacca, Siam, and Nagasaki.
Macau’s second unique characteristic is that
throughout its 500 year history, the city’s specific political
status has been ambiguous. When the Portuguese first
settled in Macau, China did not formally yield power to
the Europeans, and there was no formal designation of
the specific size or boundaries of the territory (Breitung,
2007: 33). No existing historical records document the
exact administrative agreement concerning Macau
that was forged between the Chinese and Portuguese,
and the territory did not clearly belong exclusively
to one or the other power. Historian K.C. Fok (1999)
characterizes this arrangement as an uncodified but
formative “Macau Formula”, by which Chinese leaders
allowed the foreigners to settle in the peripheral location
on China’s southern coast where they could be confined
and controlled, engaged with expediently for economic
benefit, and otherwise left alone to manage themselves.
In this way the Chinese could benefit from trade with
Europe without threat to the internal stability of the
country, and the Macau Formula would be replicated in
other Chinese locales.
Not technically a colony, Macau was jointly governed
by both Portugal and China in a tacit partnership that
served the interest of both states, each of which used
the territory for activities which were inconvenient at
home. Macau therefore served as a hybrid locale with

the sort of dual allegiances typical of medieval cities
(Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Henders, 2001). In her book
Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of
Chineseness, anthropologist Cathryn Clayton (2010)
refers to this defining characteristic as the city’s “sortof sovereignty”. “The details surrounding the earliest
Portuguese settlement in Macau are lost, or, more
likely, were never recorded,” notes Clayton. “To many
historians, the haziness of this origin story is the origin
of Macau’s sovereignty problem. To others, this haziness
was the condition of possibility for the very existence of
Macau” (41).
As the city’s importance to global trade eventually
waned along with Portugal’s global influence, Portuguese
officials in Macau sought to exploit the city’s ambiguous
sovereignty for a variety of marginal economic activities.
When China ceded Hong Kong to Britain in the wake of
the Opium Wars, Portugal attempted to emulate Britain’s
role in that city and asserted formal colonial control
over Macau, legalizing opium production, prostitution,
gambling, and indentured servitude (Asome, 2014).
Macau’s protean sovereign status endured several
transformations over the next century. When the
United Nations pressured member states to decolonize
after World War 2, Portugal’s Prime Minister Antonio
Salazar resisted this pressure and endeavored to retain
the country’s extensive overseas possessions in Asia and
Africa. In 1951, through diplomatic sleight of hand,
Portugal revised its constitution and redefined Macau
as an “overseas province” of the country, a paradoxical
delineation which declared Macau to be both part of
the nation’s sovereign territory and simultaneously
not a part of that territory. When a leftist coup finally
overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship of Marcelo
Caetano in the Carnation Revolution of 1974, Portugal
began the formal process of decolonization, and made
two separate attempts over the next several years to
return Macau to the PRC, only to have the PRC refuse
both offers (Clayton, 2009).
Finally, when the two countries established formal
diplomatic relations in 1979 they reached a secret
agreement to reclassify Macau as a “Chinese territory
under Portuguese administration”, creating an entirely
new sort of legal entity which was no longer a colony,
but also not quite a sovereign state. Macau was again
simultaneously, and ambiguously, both Portuguese
and Chinese. It was under this curious designation in
the final years of Portugal’s administration of Macau
in which the eruption of the triad crime wave was
attributed to Macau’s sovereignty “problem”. So let me
3
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turn now to the role of the triads in Macau’s gaming Gambling Inspection and Coordination Bureau, was
industry.
shot two times at close range by a motorcycle gunman
as he sat behind the wheel of his car on the street outside
Macau’s Gaming Industry
his office. One bullet passed through his cheeks while
After gambling was legalized in Macau in the mid-19th the other struck his neck, barely missing his spine; and
century, the industry generally operated as a monopoly though he was gravely injured, he survived the ambush.
concession which the Portuguese administration Apolonario was a former army commando and veteran
granted to a local agent in exchange for a share of the of the guerilla warfare tactics common to the entrenched
profits. Hong Kong businessman Stanley Ho Hung-Sun nationalist insurgencies waged in Portugal’s African
was awarded the monopoly concession in 1961, and colonies, but he did not expect to encounter such an
held it for 40 years, becoming a billionaire in the process attack on the relatively quiet streets of Portugueseand controlling a large swath of Macau’s economy. By controlled Macau (Fraser, 1997).
The audacious attack on a government gaming
the 1990s Ho operated an entrenched and remunerative
official
in broad daylight would later be remembered
provincial gaming empire producing annual revenues
of around $2 billion, approximately half of the amount as the start of Macau’s shocking three-year campaign
of violence which claimed 122 lives.1 “Macau, City of
generated at the time in Atlantic City.
In the 1980s, Ho made an idiosyncratic contribution Fear: The Peace is Finished”, announced a prophetic
to the development of Macau’s gaming industry by front-page headline in the Portuguese daily newspaper
sub-contracting the management of VIP rooms in his Macau-Hoje the day after the Apolonario shooting,
Lisboa Casino to middlemen who would recruit high- and the Casino Wars would indeed have a tremendous
rollers from China and the region and loan them money impact on life in the city in the final years of Portuguese
for gambling. These agents, who came to be called rule (Letter from Macau, 1997).
The shooting sparked a series of violent events which
junkets, serve a necessary function in Macau’s gaming
would
stretch for several years, including bombings and
industry due to strict cross-border currency controls in
the PRC (as well as Taiwan) which significantly restrict arson attacks, shootouts among rival gangs, kidnappings
the amount of money a Chinese national may bring for ransom, and the targeted assassinations of prison
to the city. Anyone from mainland China who wants guards, government officials, and gaming industry
to wager large sums in Macau’s casinos must rely on regulators. Criminals appeared to act with virtual
local loans. Unlike Las Vegas, where casinos regularly impunity, and Portuguese authorities seemed unable to
advance gambling credit to high rollers, Macau’s gaming effectively address the violence, punish the perpetrators,
law prohibited local casinos from loaning money to or maintain any semblance of law and order in the city.
But what elevated this violent activity above the
gamblers. In addition, since gambling debts are not
legally enforceable in mainland courts, individuals normal nitty-gritty of gangland turf wars was the
who advanced such loans had to be confident of their manner in which many of the events exuded an
ability to secure repayment by extra-judicial means. almost cinematic quality which, in sharp contrast to
For this reason organized crime groups became a the normally inconspicuous nature of Triad activities
crucial component of VIP gaming in Macau (Wang and befitting a “secret brotherhood”, seemed specifically
calculated to achieve maximum visibility (Pina-Cabral,
Eadington, 2008).
In the late 1990s, in the final three years of Portuguese 2005). A Molotov cocktail was hurled matter-ofrule, a dramatic wave of violent crime erupted in the factly onto the manicured grounds of the Governor’s
city, as rival triad organizations began fighting to claim Mansion; hitmen holding pistols in both hands calmly
their share of profits from loan sharking, extortion, executed rivals as they dined in crowded restaurants;
drugs, prostitution, and other vices in the city before it and rider-less motorcycles with flaming tissues stuffed
into open gas tanks careened down empty streets to
converted to Chinese control.
explode dramatically into glass shop windows. These
heavily-mediated events invited international attention,
The Casino Wars
concern, and condemnation; contributed negatively
The first shot of the casino wars was levied on
to both the city’s tourism industry and the citizenry’s
November 26, 1996, when Lieutenant Colonel Manuel
Antonio Apolonario, the vice director of Macau’s 1 My account of the Casino Wars is drawn primarily from Clayton (2010: 59-98); Linter (2003); Pina-Cabral (2002; 2005).
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morale; and prompted increasingly loud calls for PRC
authorities to step into the Portuguese territory and
exercise control over the mayhem.
Much of the violence was attributed to an internecine
conflict within the city’s 14K Triad, as senior gang
member “Street Market” Ng Wai engaged in a power
struggle with former protégé “Broken Tooth” Wan
Kuok-Koi, a charismatic upstart who would become
Macau’s most notorious gangster (Linter, 2002). For
his part, the flamboyant Koi contributed significantly
to the theatrical ambiance of Macau’s Triad activity,
boasting openly of his gangland prowess in interviews
he conducted with Time and Newsweek, and ultimately
even producing the Hong Kong film Casino, a thinlyveiled autobiographical account of his rise to power in
the Macau underworld which was shot illegally in the
streets of the city.
The casino wars culminated on May 5, 1998, when
the personal minivan of Antonio Marques Baptista,
the Chief of Macau’s Judiciary Police, exploded in his
driveway while he was walking his dog nearby. Baptista
(aka “Rambo”) was not injured in the blast, and several
hours later he and his men burst into a private dining
room in the Lisboa Hotel to arrest Broken Tooth, where
they found him watching an interview of himself on a
Hong Kong television station. Two days after Broken
Tooth’s arrest the film Casino debuted in Hong Kong,
though it was banned in Macau.
It ultimately took two trials to convict Broken
Tooth of a crime, given the reluctant participation of
unenthusiastic attorneys, forgetful witnesses, and even
the surprise resignation of a presiding judge. Near the
end of the second trial the members of the three-judge
tribunal which presided over the court proceedings
retired to their chambers to view Casino, and concluded
that it was indeed an accurate document of Broken
Tooth’s triad activities. Mere membership in a criminal
brotherhood is a criminal offense in Hong Kong
and Macau, and after two weeks of deliberation, on
November 23, 1999 Broken Tooth was declared guilty,
with his own film comprising part of the evidence used
to convict him. The court sentenced him to 15 years to
be served in a special high-security wing of Macau’s
prison which had been constructed especially to house
him.
The Casino Wars constituted the unceremonious
final act of Portugal’s governance of Macau, and set
the stage for China’s sovereign takeover of the city. On
December 20, 1999, one month after Broken Tooth’s
incarceration, the Portuguese flag was lowered, and

China’s longest continually-occupied foreign territory,
and the last remaining European colony in Asia,
formally succumbed to Chinese authority. In addition
to asserting governmental authority over Macau, the
PRC seized the opportunity provided by the social
unrest to march a contingent of 500 PLA soldiers into
the city only 12 hours after the handover ceremony, an
act which contradicted Portugal and China’s agreement
(Chan, 2003). Given the breakdown in public order,
and as predicted by the Wall Street Journal reporter
who covered the Casino Wars, the Macau populace
for the most part positively received not only the city’s
retrocession to the PRC but the intervention of the PLA
as well, hoping that the changes would produce a more
stable environment.
Macau’s Strategic Ambiguity
Clayton argues that the ostensible focus of the
extensive media coverage of the Casino Wars was
not so much the violence itself as it was an indirect
commentary on Macau’s “sort-of ” sovereign status,
which was depicted as the underlying cause of the city’s
transgressions. The consistent representation of Macau
throughout its history as an illicit enclave operating
“outside” the international order, which was exacerbated
on the global stage by the lurid media accounts of
the Triad violence, and which culminated in Broken
Tooth’s film, was ultimately a “way of representing
Macau as a kind of ‘matter out of place’”, says Clayton, “a
pathological exception that reinscribed the hegemony
and legitimacy of modern state sovereignty” (Clayton,
2009: 98).
Thus, for Clayton, the Casino Wars led to the
termination of the ambiguity surrounding Macau’s
sovereign status and the city’s final incorporation,
as a component of the PRC, into a Westphalian
international order of sovereign nation states. But in
seeking to understand Macau’s role in the PRC today,
my own interest is not in the question of representation,
or how the world at large came to view Macau as a
failed state whose deficiencies were attributable to its
ambiguous sovereignty, but in the city’s pragmatic
function in China’s economic reforms. That is, I want
to explore how the PRC was able to mobilize Macau’s
semi-sovereign status, and even its once-taboo casino
industry, for its own governmental purposes. From this
perspective the PRC’s post-handover designation of the
enclave as a “Special Administrative Region” was not
so much a normalization of Macau as a conventional
actor in a Westphalian international order, as it was
5
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have relied on decentralized and experimental modes of
practice to generate policy innovations. Local officials
are often given broad discretion to test new “model
experiments” which, if successful, may be duplicated
elsewhere.
One example of this experimental policy development
is Deng Xiaoping’s creation in the late 1970s of coastal
Special Economic Zones to serve as “laboratories of
capitalist production” where China could enter into
joint partnerships with foreign companies, learn how to
operate factories and manage workers, and experiment
with a market economy. The SEZs were the locus of
the production-for-export regime with which China
launched its economic reforms.
The Shenzhen SEZ, which is adjacent to Hong Kong,
is perhaps the most significant and well-known such
locale (O’Donnell et al, 2017), but we may also similarly
understand the Macau SAR as an experimental zone.
In her influential book Neoliberalism as Exception:
Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Ong (2006)
interprets these zones as avant-garde governmental
innovations. From Ong’s perspective China’s SEZs and
SARs are consistent with a regional strategy of economic
development which understands neoliberalism, not as a
state doctrine of limited government, but as a sort of
mobile tool-kit of opportunistic policies which may
be strategically applied to select specially-designated
locales, or privileged segments of a national population,
in order to facilitate their engagements with global
capital. Ong refers to Macau’s SAR status as a futureoriented “zoning technology” which (as she says of
Hong Kong) “allows for experimentation with different
degrees of civil rights in a vibrant capitalist setting, a
milieu that acts as a laboratory for China’s future” (110).
While I agree with Ong’s conception of Macau as
an experimental laboratory for future governance, and
one measure of the success of this experiment is evident
in Macau’s unlikely rise to the ranks of the world’s
wealthiest territories, I suggest that the underlying logic
of the city’s role in this process lies less in contemporary
Chinese neoliberalism than in the origins of the
territory’s sovereign status.2 That is, whereas Ong might
describe Macau’s SAR status as postmodern or neoliberal,

a formalization and protraction of the city-state’s
ambiguous status. That is, my interest is not Macau’s
movement, through China, into the international
geopolitical order; but rather China’s movement, through
Macau, into global capitalism. Macau’s crucial role in
the origins of capitalism would recur at the emergence
of a new revolutionary regime of Sino-capitalism which
has transformed China into the world’s most dynamic
economy. Macau’s function in the PRC is defined by the
city’s distinct regime of casino capitalism.
Experimental Governance
After the handover, and under a new policy of
“Macau ruled by Macau people”, the nascent local
government made a strategic decision to liberalize the
gambling monopoly concession and invite investment
from foreign gaming companies. Government officials
hoped that foreign competition would not only help
professionalize the industry, but would strengthen the
legitimacy of Macau’s postcolonial administration and
function indirectly to maintain law and order in the city
(Lo, 2005).
The government launched a public tender, and
through a complicated bidding and selection process, in
2002 the monopoly arrangement was replaced by a group
of six casino concessions and sub-concessions. One
concession was awarded to previous monopoly holder
Ho; the others went to Wynn Resorts and Adelson’s Las
Vegas Sands, as well as various partnerships involving
MGM, two of Ho’s children, and companies from Hong
Kong and Australia. Today these companies cooperate
with the Macau government and the Chinese state to
operate the industry and administer the city’s economy.
We may understand this governance structure as
consistent with what anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2006)
calls a regional “state-transnational network”, whereby
aspects of state governance are taken up by private
actors located in special governmental zones. But we
may also observe the similarity of this contemporary
arrangement to the medieval “Macau Formula” through
which China and Portugal first governed the city.
Under this new regime of implicit shared sovereignty,
Macau has been transformed into an experimental
laboratory in which transnational non-state actors
cooperate with the Chinese state to test China’s marketsocialist policies, and to engender post-socialist Chinese
subjects appropriate to the reform era. Although it is
common to conceive of China as a tightly centralized
state, political scientist Sebastian Heilmann (2018)
contends that both the Mao and post-Mao governments

2 My point may be clarified by reference to recent scholarship
about Native American sovereignty and the operation of gambling enclaves on tribal lands in North America. That is, like
those Native American nations we may understand Macau as possessing not only an “acknowledged” form of sovereignty which
is generated by the PRC’s “zoning technologies”, but rather an
endemic or “inherent” sovereignty which emanates from Macau’s
unique colonial history (Hanover, 2017).
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I suggest it may be better understood as premodern and
medieval, and this inherent form of sovereignty which
has characterized Macau throughout its existence is key
to understanding the city’s casino economy today.
More than 35 million tourists visited Macau in
2018, the majority of whom were citizens of mainland
China. These Chinese tourists are not in Macau by
happenstance. China has mobilized tourism as an
economic policy to promote consumption. In the
wake of the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
pandemic, which devastated the economies of Hong
Kong and Macau, China signed a Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with both Hong Kong
and Macau and created a new experimental tourism
policy, called the Individual Visitation Scheme (IVS),
to facilitate remunerative tourist travel. The IVS grants
mainland citizens, from select cities and provinces,
special exit visas which allow them to travel to Hong
Kong and Macau as individual tourists, without the
sanction of a state-sponsored tour group. As a result
of this scheme, tourism to Macau has exploded (see
Simpson, 2018).
Alongside the economic benefits of tourism, the
Chinese government sees tourism as “an inexpensive
substitute for education” (Nyiri, 2009: 154), a
pedagogical or civilizing practice that helps create
“quality” (suzhi) citizens. Enhancing population quality
is a key objective of the state. As such, tourism “is a key
sphere in which the reinvention of the Chinese subject
takes place” (Nyiri, 2006: 97).

Las Vegas is largely attributed to Wynn and Adelson
(Cohen, 2014).
To appreciate the Sands’ innovation it is necessary to
first envision the casinos of Macau’s monopoly phase,
which were primarily small, dark, unornamented
basement rooms of hotels which lacked the glamor,
grandeur, or superlative accoutrements common in
Las Vegas. In fact, “It ain’t Vegas” was the typical way I
heard the Lisboa Casino described by other expatriates
when I first arrived in Macau in 2001.
The Sands Macau was designed by Paul Steelman,
one of the world’s most accomplished casino architects,
and Steelman (2011a, 2011b) refers to the Sands Macau
as constituting “the most unique design of a casino
ever”. There is no doubt that it was markedly different
from anything that existed in Macau at the time, and
also a departure from prevailing trends in global
gaming design. Adelson and Steelman studied the
Macau market in order to create a design innovation
specifically adapted to the Chinese gambler.
The property was designed according to Chinese
feng shui principles, such as avoiding sharp edges and
pointed ornamentation, which Steelman claims was a
first in global casino design, but which has become more
common in intervening years as Chinese tourists have
begun to venture abroad to other gaming jurisdictions.
In his preparatory fieldwork among gamblers in
Macau, Steelman also observed that for Chinese players
gambling was not a “tandem” activity in which people
engaged as a counterpart to other activities. The large
majority of Chinese tourists traveled to Macau on day
trips and gambling was their primary and often singular
motive to visit the city.
Finally, Steelman observed that the Chinese
approach to gambling itself is distinct from its western
counterpart. Chinese gambling is “less an activity and
more of a sport,” he says; wagering takes the form of
a head-to-head competition between the gambler and
the casino. It is typical for other gamblers to crowd
around a table and cheer the action, and back-betting
is a common practice. Therefore, given this Chinse style
of gambling as a competitive spectator sport, Steelman
designed the casino in the manner of a stadium whose
structure would facilitate casual surveillance and
observation of gaming activities.
At the time it was built the Sands was the largest
casino in the world, and Steelman designed the Sands’
enormous, brightly-illuminated gaming floor for
maximum visibility. The Sand’s main gaming floor has
a 60-foot ceiling, the highest of any existing casino. The

The Sands Casino Experiment
To understand Macau’s role in this process, I turn
finally to a brief discussion of the Sands Macau, which
was Adelson’s first casino property in the city, and an
expression of Macau’s governmental experimentation
and new “state-transnational” sovereignty. The Sands
is exemplary of the manner in which China and
transnational capital cooperate to experiment with
economic governance in Macau. China selects specific
tourist populations and facilitates their travel via the
IVS, and Adelson provided a novel casino environment
which was specifically designed to attract these tourists.
When it opened the Sands featured an innovative
design, with outsized dimensions and innovative
characteristics which contrasted dramatically with
Macau’s pre-handover casinos. This new casino
design would serve as a stepping stone to the eventual
introduction of the integrated casino resort into Macau’s
industry, a spatial technology whose development in
7
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stadium-style design allows the entire main floor to be
observed from the open floors that circle above it. This
design not only facilitates observation of gambling, but
promotes visibility, panopticism, and transparency,
which transformed the corporeal experience of gambling
for tourists in Macau in the wake of the Casino Wars.
The Sands exemplifies a spatial production of the
urban environment whereby the impending threat of
violence and urban disorder is eradicated, to be replaced
by a spatial diagram of order and visibility designed
to transform urban life. The Sands helped provide a
golden glass veneer of legitimation for the junkets and
helped garner a new-found respectability for the casino
industry among locals, prompting many young people
to flock to jobs in the industry (see Simpson et al, 2009).
As one Macau junket executive who previously worked
in Las Vegas, Reno, and Atlantic City, observed:

individual in the US in 2006, and his profits enabled his
subsequent funding forays into US politics.
Casino Capitalism
Macau’s retrocession, and the city’s endemic sortof sovereignty, enabled a new form of Chinese casino
capitalism whereby the casino serves not simply as a site
for entertainment or revenue, but as a pedagogical device
for producing new post-socialist Chinese subjects.
Political economist Susan Strange (1986) coined the
term “casino capitalism” in 1986 to characterize the
increasingly volatile era of financialization, in which she
observed that “The Western financial system is rapidly
coming to resemble nothing so much as a vast casino”
(1). The fecund phrase “casino capitalism” has been
adopted by a number of scholars of gambling, generally
in the same way Strange used it, as an analogy for a
risk-intensive global economy. However, this is not my
intention.
For example, in one of the best such treatments
of casino capitalism, applied to a study of another
Adelson casino in the former steel town of Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, Chloe Taft (2016) deploys the construct
of casino capitalism to demonstrate how in a postindustrial economy the casino parodies the productive
role of the industrial factory. Bethlehem’s casino, the
design of which carries a factory theme, is understood
by some employees – many of whom are themselves
former steel workers -- as a new sort of factory for
a post-industrial age. One of Taft’s respondents
imaginatively summarizes this conventional notion of
casino capitalism:

As an outsider I can say, the Sands Macao was probably
the most perfectly designed casino I have ever seen. It
was a home run in every aspect. It was laid out perfectly, with the customer lines, with the toilets just next
to the escalator; the bar is situated perfectly, the layout
of the tables, the ceiling height, and the lighting. . . .
The intention was not to build an integrated resort, but
it was the first step for the company to enter the Macao
market and to change the rules of the game, and they
were changed dramatically. (Simpson et al, 2009)

The distinction between Ho’s Lisboa Casino and the
Sands was not merely a difference in ornamentation
or interior design, but the imposition of a new
governmental regime in Macau. On opening day, May
18, 2004, excited Chinese tourists who had gathered in
anticipation of the opening, and sparked by (untrue)
rumors that complementary chips would be provided
to the first visitors, clambered over gates and surged
against the building’s entrance in an effort to enter. Sands’
security personnel had to literally break 16 glass doors
off their hinges to prevent tourists from getting injured
in the melee. This indelible image of intractable masses
served as a sign of a new social order in Macau, whereby
the casino wars were subsumed by the imposition of a
new regime of casino capitalism. The impending threat
of violence today emanates not from triad mayhem but
from overzealous tourists eager to try their luck at the
tables.
The initial returns on the Sands investment surprised
everyone. Profits generated by his Macau casino allowed
Adelson to recoup his initial $240 million investment in
ten months, causing him to leap twelve spaces on the
Forbes 400 chart; Adelson became the third wealthiest
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were fomented in the Shenzhen SEZ.
When Macau was founded in 1557 with the
implementation of China’s Macau Formula, the city’s
ambiguous sovereignty allowed it to function as a
crucial mediator between the isolationist Ming dynasty
and European traders. Today, the transformation of
Macau’s Casino Wars into a benign regime of casino
capitalism, and the concomitant incorporation of
the once isolationist PRC into the global economy, is
again enabled by the crucial role of the city’s endemic,
autochthonous, sort-of sovereignty.
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